In Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), key management is the core issue of any security approaches. The main challenge in WSNs key management is how to distribute and manage secret keys within WSN nodes. Several schemes are proposed for this purpose. Another challenge which was not tackled by most of the proposed schemes is the behavior of network in case of nodes capturing, since once any node is captured by an adversary, all the information stored in its memory could be compromised. In this paper we propose a key management scheme for hierarchical WSNs. In addition; we propose a mechanism concerning adding of new sensor nodes, and keys revocation and re-keying processes to overcome nodes capturing crisis. Then we will evaluate the secrecy of our scheme by analyzing the security properties of our proposed scheme with other previous proposed schemes.
Introduction
WSNs are being deployed for a wide variety of applications. There are two different network models used for WSNs with each model having its own characteristics. A flat distributed network in which all nodes have the same capabilities and a hierarchical network in which some nodes that called Cluster Heads (CHs) have higher capabilities than others that called normal Sensor Nodes (SNs) [1] . The hierarchical (heterogeneous) network model has more operational advantages than the flat homogeneous model for SNs with their inherent limitations on power and processing capabilities [2, 3] . Many applications of WSNs require secure data communications, especially in a hostile environment as in military field. So the increased attention of key management in WSNs which is the most important and difficult issue in security is obviously seen recently. In general the key management includes the processes of generation, distribution, encryption, and revocation of secret key. For WSNs, symmetric keys are more preferred for data encryption due to the resource constraints of SNs, since public key infrastructure is considered to be not suitable to provide security for WSNs because of complexity and power consumption overhead. But some studies on elliptic curves cryptography indicate that algorithm based on this kind of cryptography could be a potential choice [4] . There are three keying models in WSNs, network keying in which the entire network has the same shared key, group keying in which each group in a network has a shared key, third is the pairwise keying in which each pair of nodes in a network has a unique shared key [5] .
Concerning key distribution, due to unpredictable network topology and lack of infrastructure support, key pre-distribution mechanism could be a practical solution to these constraints in WSN. The basic idea of key pre-distribution scheme is preloading some secret or some keys information into sensor nodes (SNs) before they are deployed. After deployment, the shared keys will be detected using preloaded secret keys or keys information [6] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; section 2 presents an overview of previous proposed key management schemes for WSNs. Sections 3 and 4 include our proposed key management scheme and re-keying mechanism respectively. Section 5 introduces an evaluation of our proposal according to other previous proposed schemes. Section 6 will conclude the paper, followed by the proposed future work.
Overview of Previous Proposed Key Management Schemes for WSNs
Several key management schemes have been proposed recently in WSN. These schemes can be classified according to several aspects. One of the important aspects is the key establishment techniques in which schemes are classified according to the two kinds of approaches that they use, either probabilistic, or deterministic [7] . Probabilistic approach is characterized by the use of key chains, which are randomly selected from a large key pool and preloaded into sensor nodes, and then a shared key between each pair of nodes will be detected after deployment. While in deterministic approach; deterministic processes are used after network deployment to generate the shared key between each pair of nodes using the related preloaded information. Here we will introduce an overview on previous proposed key management schemes according to the homogeneity of WSN (i.e.; flat or hierarchical WSN) taking into account key establishment classifications.
Key Management Schemes of Flat WSNs
Eschenauer and Gligor (E&G) introduced a probabilistic key predistribution scheme [8] , which is considered the basic scheme for key management in WSN. This scheme suffers from shortage of authentication [9] . Chan et al. proposed a "q-composite" probabilistic scheme which is very similar to the basic scheme with differences in the size of key pool, and using multiple keys (q) to establish communication link between two sensor nodes instead of one key [10] . Du, et al. proposed a probabilistic scheme using deployment knowledge technique [11] . This scheme, exploits deployment knowledge only guaranteeing that any two neighboring nodes can find a common secret key with a certain probability (p). Based on location aware technique, Huang et al. proposed a probabilistic scheme [12] . Location aware based key pre-distribution schemes can be used only for some specific applications that have static and well-known configuration like light traffic sensors. Based on polynomial symmetric function (f(x, y) = f(y, x)) of t-degree threshold, Du et al. proposed a deterministic scheme in which to establish a pairwise key, each node evaluates the polynomial at the identity (id) of the other sensor node [13] . Based on Combinatorial Design Theory (CDT), Campte proposed another deterministic scheme which is using block design technique in CDT [14] . This scheme tries to increase key sharing probability among the sensor nodes by designing the key chains.
Key Management Schemes of Hierarchical WSNs
Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) [15] is considered the basic hierarchical key management scheme in WSNs. It is a deterministic key management scheme in which four types of secret keys are used as follows; individual key to communicate between each node in a network and BS, pairwise key to communicate between each pair of nodes, cluster key to communicate between a group of nodes (cluster members), and network key which is a shared key between all nodes in a network including BS. Du, et al. presented the Asymmetric Pre-distribution (AP) scheme for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks (HSN) [16] . It is a deterministic scheme. The basic idea of the AP key management scheme is to preload a large number of keys in each CH while only pre-loads a small number of keys in each SN. Shen et al. proposed the recent deterministic hierarchical scheme which is based on polynomial key calculations mechanism such that each network node is preloaded with a number of polynomial coefficients (g j ) [17] . A Low-Energy Key Management (LEKM) protocol is a probabilistic key management scheme proposed by Gaurave et al. [18] . Kausar et al. proposed the recent probabilistic key management scheme for WSNs, which is based on a random key pre-distribution, where each SN and CH in a network is preloaded with different numbers of generation keys (g ki ) [19] . Then exchanges of information are done to detect the secret keys between each SN with each of neighbor and with its CH.
Our Proposed Key Management Scheme for WSNs

Network Model
Network model in our scheme is based on three tier hierarchical architecture as shown in Fig. 1 . Base Station (BS), Cluster Head node (CH) and Sensor Node (SN). Our proposal considers that a large number of SNs and an optimum number of CHs will be randomly distributed in a specific area and the BS is located in a well-known protected place such that it is trusted and not able to be captured by any adversary. A Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) is preloaded in each CH to generate an initial random number (r CH ). There are two different hash functions; first is a common hash function (H C ) that is used in all network devices (SN, CH, BS), which is used to generate the pairwise key between each pair of CHs, CH with each of its cluster members (SNs), and the BS with each of CH and SN in a network. Second, a private hash function (H) for each of CH in a network to calculate a private random value (R CH ) which is used in generation of pairwise keys as discussed later on .
The used notations are defined in Table 1 ;
Fig. 1 Network Model in Our Proposed Key Management Scheme
Phases of Our Proposed Scheme
Our approach has four phases, key pre-distribution phase, initialization and cluster formation phase, intra and inter-cluster pairwise keys establishment phase, and erasure phase.
Key Pre-distribution Phase
It is an off-line phase in which some parameters as node identity (id) and others should be preloaded in each node before deployment in WSN. These parameters are loaded into SNs and CHs by a Key Distribution Server (KSD) which could be the BS itself. In our proposal each SN and CH will be preloaded by its identity (id) and other parameters as follows: (R SNi ) which is used to generate its pairwise key with the BS and its CH. The SN random value (R SNi ) is assigned through two steps as shown in Fig. 2 . First, input the SN i identity (id SNi ) as seed toPRNG of a large enough period to produce a sequence of n numbers (e.g. PRNG (id SNi ) = r 1SNi , r 2SNi, r 3SNi, … r nSNi ). Second, input the selected random number r mSNi (where m = 1: n) into BS private hash function (H BS ) with the master key (K M ) to produce the SN i random value (R SNi ). (1):
Initialization and Cluster Formation Phase
It is the first phase after nodes deployment in a field, in which the essential information are exchanged, and clusters are configured. Many algorithms are presented to configure the clusters as in [20] , [21] , [22] which is out of scope of our study. In cluster formation processes of our proposal, each CH in a network selects its random value (R CH ). The same two steps as in SN random value generation is done to the CH taking into account that second step may be repeated several times as shown in Fig .3 . Fig. 3 Process of CH i Random Value (R CHi ) Generation In this phase pairwise keys will be generated between a CH and each of its cluster members (SNs), each pair of CHs in a network, and BS with each of CH in a network using the common hash function (H C ) as in (2), (3), and (4).
After that each CH sends an encrypted message to BS using the sharing key (K CH, BS ) including all information about its cluster.
Erasure Phase
All preloaded and generated initial information (K M , R BS,CH , R SN , and R CH ) will be erased from each CH and SN in a network. Summary of our proposal is presented in Fig. 4 .
Adding New SNs and Re-keying Mechanism
There are two cases are worthy to be solved in WSNs key management. First, adding of new SNs which may be needed for enlarge the network or replacing of depleted SNs. Second, key revocation and re-keying mechanism, which is needed in case of node capturing.
In our proposal, the necessary step in both cases is the dissemination of new master key (K M ) to all CHs in secured messages using pairewise keys between BS and CHs as in (5) .
Adding of New SNs
The added SNs should be preloaded with the new K M . After deployment, each added SN broadcasts a secured message including its identity (id SNi ). Consequently, CHs in range of its transmission area will generate a new random value (R CHi ) as shown in Fig. 3 , and broadcast a secured message including their id CHi , and the generated R CHi . Then the processes of pairwise key generation between SN i and CH i will be consumed according to our original proposal in Fig. 4 .
Revocation and Re-keying Mechanism
Our proposal for re-keying mechanism includes four stages; detection of compromised node, dissemination of compromised node identity, revocation of compromised keys, and re-keying.
Fig. 4. Flowchart of our proposal
Detection of Compromised Node Stage
There are several proposed algorithms to discover and designate the compromised node, which is out of scope of our study.
Dissemination of Compromised Node Identity Stage
In case of sensor node compromising (SN c ), BS will send secured caution messages including the compromised node identity (id SNc ) to all CHs which are relevant to SN c to inform them about SN c . While in case of CH compromising, BS will send a caution messages to all SNs connected to compromised cluster head (CH c ) and to all other CHs in a network.
Revocation of Compromised Keys Stage
In case of SN compromising, BS and CH will revoke their pairewise keys with SN c , also id SNc will revoked from all relevant CHs lists. In case of CH compromising, its pairewise keys with all other network CHs and its cluster members (SNs) will be revoked.
Re-keying Stage
In case of SN compromising, there is no need to re-keying because the only pairwise keys with BS and with its CH will be revoked, so there is no more actions. In case of CH compromising (CH c ), cluster members (SNs) of CH c should re-key their pairewise keys with other non-compromised CHs in a network, so the following steps will be preceded:
a) The second CH in SN list (List SN ) will generate a new R CH , and send it to BS after receiving the caution message. b) BS will generate a new R SN for each of SN in a compromised cluster, and then send a secured message to each of SN in compromised cluster including its new generated random value (R SN ), and new CH information (id CH and R CH ). In addition, BS will send the information of new SNs members (id SN and R SN ) to CH. c) Then CH and each of new SN in its cluster will calculate their pairewise key using common hash function (H C ) as in original algorithm.
Summary of key revocation and re-keying mechanism is presented in Fig. 5 .
Fig. 5 Key Revocation and Re-keying Mechanism
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Evaluation of Our Proposed Scheme
To explore the advantages of our proposed key management scheme, it should be evaluated or in other words should be compared with other previous proposed schemes. In this section, we will analyze the security properties of our proposed scheme comparatively with LEAP scheme [15] which is considered the basic hierarchical key management scheme in WSNs, and with both of Kausar et al. scheme [19] and Shen et al. scheme [17] which are the most recent hierarchy schemes in WSNs.
Security Analysis
A key establishment technique is not judged solely based upon its ability to provide secrecy of transferred messages after establishment of secret keys, but must also meet certain other criteria for efficiency in light vulnerability to adversaries including the protection of exchanged information during secret key establishment phases, key revocation, and network resiliency [24] .
There are two aspects to be discussed, first, the achieving of basic security requirements (confidentiality -authentication -authorization) during secret key establishment phases. Second, network resiliency which is one of the important security analysis aspects.
Achieving of Security Requirements
In our proposed scheme, all exchanged information in all phases are encrypted by a preloaded temporary key (K M ) which is erased after establishment of secret keys, so all basic security requirements (confidentiality -authentication -authorization) are achieved.
Concerning LEAP scheme [15] , in dependency on a needed short period to establish the secret keys, LEAP exchanges the initial information in plain, while the acknowledgement is authenticated using a preloaded initial key. So the basic security requirements are not achieved since confidentiality and authorization services are not achieved, while the authentication is achieved in acknowledgement messages only.
For Kausar et al. scheme [19] , all exchanged information in cluster formation phase are in plain, while in other key establishment phases are authenticated. Then we can globally say that, there are no achieving of confidentially and authorization security services.
For Shen et al. scheme [17] , there is no proposed vision for cluster formation and all exchanged information for secret key establishment are in plain. , and other network CHs will be compromised. Our proposed scheme includes a mechanism for compromised key revocation and re-keying. This mechanism includes the necessary processes to retrieve the network security efficiency in cases of SN or CH capturing.
For LEAP scheme, one of the major drawbacks is that it assumes that the secret keys have never been disclosed and then it is not resilient for compromised nodes [25] . So in case of SNs or CHs capturing, the group key will be revealed, thereby all the entire network communication links will be compromised (i.e., the probability of compromised communication links = 1). In addition, there is no proposed mechanism for keys revocation and re-keying.
For Kausar et al. scheme, the probability of total number of compromised keys, or network compromised communication links as in (6);
where, n` is the number of compromised SNs, r is the number of preloaded generation keys, M is the number of chains of generation keys. The similar case for CH capturing as in (7);
where, s is the number of preloaded generation keys, m` is the number of compromised CHs in network. In addition, the proposed mechanism for key revocation and re-keying is only including the actions of SN capturing, and not include any actions for CH capturing [26] .
For Shen scheme, it is similar to our proposed scheme but the difference or in other words the major drawback of Shen scheme is that there is no proposed mechanism for key revocation and re-keying [26] .
Figures 6 and 7 show the compromising probability of non-compromised nodes communication links (network resiliency) versus the number of compromised SNs (n`) and CHs (m`) respectively for compared schemes. We assumed that the network is uniformly distributed (i.e., each cluster has n/m members, where n is the total number of SNs in network and m is the total number of CHs in network). For Kausar scheme, we assumed the preloaded generation keys (r) and (s) are equal 10 and 150 keys respectively which achieve the highest probability of key sharing among nodes (the probabilities = 0.99) with key chains (M) equal 400 chains as in [19] .
Fig. 6 SNs Resiliency versus Number of Compromised SNs (n`)
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Fig. 7 CHs Resiliency versus Number of Compromised CHs (m`)
From the above discussions and Figs. 6 and 7, it is shown that our proposal has the strongest network resiliency whatever the number of captured (compromised) nodes, while LEAP is the weakest one. For Kausar et al. scheme, it depends on the number of both of captured nodes, key chains (M), and preloaded generation keys. Note that for all studied schemes, the network resiliency does not depend on the number of network size.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a secure, scalable, simple, and efficient key management protocol for WSNs based on a three-tier network hierarchy (BS, CH, and SN) with simple computations and low communications. In addition, we proposed a key revocation and rekeying mechanism which is considered a complementary feature for our proposed scheme. Then we analyze the security property of our proposal comparatively with other recent previous schemes to explore the features of our proposal.
In our future work we will implement our proposed scheme in a test bed to measure its performance in terms of key storage overhead and communication overhead, and some other metrics as power consumption, simplicity, and scalability. Also we will study our proposed scheme immunity against various security attacks.
